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1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, completed on 
December 10, 1997, called for the creation of three mechanisms to effectively control global greenhouse 
gas emissions. There should be an emissions trading mechanism,1 which in its initial phase would include a 
subset of OECD and Eastern European countries (referred to as Annex I countries), a “clean development” 
mechanism, which in a later stage would allow developing countries to participate in emissions trading, and 
a financial mechanism, which would facilitate transfers of income, technology and other valuable resources 
from rich to poor countries. The idea behind the clean development mechanism is articulated in Article 11 
of the Protocol, whereby (1) “[developing] countries will benefit from project activities resulting in 
certified emissions reductions,” and (2) “[developed countries] may use the certified emissions reductions 
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments.” As for the financial mechanism, the Conference of the Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which represents the supreme body of the 
Convention, has delegated the responsibility of operating such a mechanism to the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). The GEF was established in 1990 by the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 
 The Kyoto Protocol motivates us to study the efficiency properties of an interregional policy 
scheme which features both resource transfers and trading of carbon dioxide emissions. In doing so, we are 
also motivated by the USA’s decision to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which occurred shortly after the 
Bush administration took office in 2001. Whether or not the USA’s government was justified in 
“withdrawing” from the Kyoto Protocol is beyond the scope of this paper. We are mostly interested in 
investigating the potential implications for the allocation of resources in the global economy if all regions 
but one decide to participate in the interregional policy scheme.2 
                                                            
1 The call for emissions trading was, no doubt, motivated by the effectiveness of marketable permit 
programs in the USA (see, e.g., Hahn (1989) and Stavins (1998)). Furthermore, an impressive amount of 
research and experience underscores the benefits and costs associated with emissions trading programs 
(see, e.g., Maloney and Yandle (1984), Coggins and Swinton (1996) and references therein). 
 
2 We do explore the interesting issue of coalition formation in this paper. For good examples of papers that 
examine endogenous participation in international agreements, see Barrett (1994) and Black et. al (1993). 
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 We show that the equilibrium allocation for a global economy implied by an interregional policy 
scheme in which one region – the USA – does not participate is inefficient because resources are not 
transferred from or to the USA and the USA’s government neglects the negative effects that its carbon 
dioxide emissions cause to the rest of the world. For a similar global economy, we also show that the 
equilibrium allocation implied by an interregional policy scheme which includes all regions in the globe – a 
scheme which we refer to as “Ideal Kyoto Protocol” – is Pareto efficient. The intuition for this important 
finding is simple and straightforward. The redistributive interregional transfer mechanism operated by an 
interregional agency – say, the GEF – makes every regional government realize that it is in its best interest 
to maximize global income. Every government knows, therefore, that its policy choice should internalize 
all externalities caused by its region’s carbon dioxide emissions. 
This paper is closely related to a set of game-theoretic papers that use sequential games to study 
provision of public goods (see, e.g., Arce (2001), Caplan et al. (2000) and Caplan and Silva (2002)). None 
of these papers, however, combines emissions trading and transfers. To our knowledge the only other 
article that features such a combination is Chichilnisky, et al. (2000). The authors demonstrate that equity 
and efficiency go hand in hand whenever carbon dioxide emissions are globally traded. In their framework, 
a market for emissions allocates resources efficiently if and only if international transfers are made in order 
to equalize social marginal utilities of consumption. They also show that this resource redistribution 
condition can be satisfied by an appropriate initial distribution of emission permits. Although our paper’s 
message is fully consistent with theirs, our approach differs from theirs in two crucial ways in what 
respects the resource redistribution: (1) it is endogenous; and, more importantly, (2) it takes place after the 
regional governments choose their most desired emission quotas. It is the anticipation of the interregional 
resource transfers implemented by the GEF that makes the regional governments behave efficiently. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds the basic model. Section 3 characterizes a 
Pareto efficient allocation. Section 4 examines regional and interregional policy schemes. In subsection 4.1, 
we consider a policy setting in which regional governments, acting independently, simultaneously 
determine their environmental policy agendas. We characterize the equilibrium allocation of resources for 
the global economy in this arrangement and then demonstrate that it is inefficient. Next, we investigate two 
interregional policy regimes. Motivated by the USA’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, in 
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subsection 4.2 we consider a policy scheme in which all regions but one in the globe participate in it. The 
USA is excluded from both interregional emissions trading and transfer mechanisms, but it is able to 
announce – i.e., commit to – a regional policy scheme before the other regions make their own policy 
commitments under the Protocol. In the policy scheme of subsection 4.3, all regions participate in both 
mechanisms and make their policy commitments simultaneously. In both interregional policy settings, the 
GEF implements transfers after it observes the policy commitments of all regions. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Basic Model 
Imagine a global economy consisting of J politically autonomous regions and governments, indexed by j, j 
= 1,...,J. There are two globally traded consumption commodities, a commodity whose production 
generates emissions of carbon dioxide (e.g., an industrial good) and a commodity whose production is 
harmed by emissions of carbon dioxide (e.g., an agricultural good). Let jY  be region j’s industrial product 
and E  be the global quantity of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere. We assume that ∑
=
≡
J
1j
jYE ; that 
is, production of a unit of the industrial good leads to the emission of a unit of carbon dioxide. 
The industrial sector in region j is competitive and consists of a large number of identical 
producers. Let jI  be the (fixed) number of industrial producers in region j. Each industrial producer utilizes 
an input quantity 0x j ≤  of the agricultural good to produce ( )jj xf  units of the industrial good. We assume 
that jf  is decreasing and strictly concave.3 Define jjj xIX ≡  as the total amount of the agricultural good 
demanded as input by region j’s industrial sector and ( ) ( )jjjjjj IXfIXF ≡  as this sector’s production 
function. Hence, ( )jjj XFY = . If we let Xp  and Yp  denote the prices of the agricultural and industrial 
goods, respectively, the profit of the industrial sector in region j is jxjY XpYp + . 
 The agricultural sector in region j is also competitive. Let jA  be region j’s (fixed) number of 
agricultural producers. Each agricultural producer utilizes an input quantity 0y j ≤  of the industrial good to 
produce ( )E,yg jj  units of the agricultural good. We assume that jg  is decreasing in both arguments and 
                                                            
3 Throughout the analysis, we use superscripts to index functions. 
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strictly concave. Let jjj yAY ≡  and ( ) ( )⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
≡⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ ∑∑
==
J
1i
i
i
jj
j
j
J
1i
i
i
j
j XF,AYgAXF,YG . Hence, region j’s 
agricultural product is ( )⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∑
=
J
1i
i
i
j
j
j XF,YGX  and its profit is jYjX YpXp + . 
 Region j is populated by jn  immobile consumers. Consumers within each region are identical in 
that they possess identical preferences and incomes. Let ( )jjj y,xU  be the utility function of a consumer in 
region j who consumes jx  units of the agricultural good and jy  units of the industrial good.
4 This function 
is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, quasiconcave and twice continuously differentiable. 
 Both industrial and agricultural goods are freely traded in global markets. Let 0jX  and 
0
jY  denote 
region j’s initial endowments of agricultural and industrial goods, respectively. In any equilibrium for the 
global economy, ( )∑
=
=−−−
J
1j
jj
0
jjj 0XXXxn  and  ( ) 0YYYyn
J
1j
jj
0
jjj =−−−∑
=
; namely, the global 
markets must clear. To keep things simple, we henceforth normalize the price of the agricultural good to 
one. This normalization will enable us to ignore the market clearing condition for the agricultural good, 
since it is automatically satisfied whenever the other conditions that characterize an equilibrium allocation 
are satisfied. The normalization also allows us to set ppY ≡ . 
3. Pareto Efficiency 
Before we examine regional and interregional environmental policy making, it is useful to derive the set of 
Pareto efficiency conditions for our economy. A Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as follows. 
Choose { }
J,...,1jjjjjjj
Y,X,Y,X,y,x
=
 to maximize ( )111 y,xU  subject to ( ) kkkk Uˆy,xU ≥ , J,...,2k = , 
( )jjj XFY ≤ , ( )⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
≤ ∑
=
J
1i
i
i
j
j
j XF,YGX , ( )∑
=
≤−−−
J
1i
ii
0
iii 0XXXxn , ( ) 0YYYyn
J
1i
ii
0
iii ≤−−−∑
=
, 
0Y,  0X,  0,  Y0,  X0,  y0x jjjjjj ≤≤≥≥≥≥ , J ..., ,1j = . An interior solution satisfies: 
( ) kkkk Uˆy,xU = ,  J,...,2k = ,     (1a) 
                                                            
4 For expositional ease, we assume that utility does not depend directly on E. It can be shown that, for a 
large family of utility functions, the results of our analysis would remain qualitatively the same if E entered 
as an arguments in the utility function. A proof of this claim is available from the authors upon request. 
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( ) 0XFY jjj >= ,  ( ) 0XF,YGX
J
1i
i
i
j
j
j >⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∑
=
, J ..., ,1j = ,  (1b) 
( )∑
=
=−−−
J
1i
ii
0
iii 0XXXxn , ( ) 0YYYyn
J
1i
ii
0
iii =−−−∑
=
,   (1c) 
k
x
k
y
1
x
1
y
U
U
U
U
= , J,...,2k = ,      (1d) 
j
Yj
x
j
y G
U
U
−= , J,...,1j = ,      (1e) 
∑
=
+=
J
1i
i
Ej
X
j
Y GF
1G , J,...,1j = .     (1f) 
Equations (1a) state that the utility constraints bind. Each region k reaches the exogenously given 
level of per capita welfare, kUˆ . Equations (1b) tell us that each region produces positive quantities of both 
commodities. Equations (1c) inform us that resources are fully employed. Equations (1d) state that 
individual marginal rates of substitution between industrial and agricultural goods must be equal across 
regions. Equations (1e) tell us that in each region the individual marginal rate of substitution between 
industrial and agricultural goods must be equal to the marginal rate of transformation for the agricultural 
good. Equations (1f) inform us that in each region the marginal rate of transformation for the agricultural 
good must be equal to the marginal rate of transformation for the industrial good. The marginal rate of 
transformation for the industrial good in each region includes the negative production effects brought about 
by global emissions of carbon dioxide. 
For future reference, it is worth noting that Pareto efficiency requires satisfaction of three 
important conditions. First, marginal agricultural products must be equalized across regions: 
k
Y
1
Y GG = , J,...,2k = .     (2a) 
Second, marginal industrial products must also be equalized across regions: 
k
X
1
X FF = , J,...,2k = .     (2b) 
Third, there must be interregional resource transfers. To see this, observe that we obtain the Pareto 
efficiency conditions (1a) – (1f) if and only if: 
k
k
xk
1
1
x
n
U
n
U λ
=µ= , J,...,2k = ,    (2c) 
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where µ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource feasibility constraint for the agricultural 
commodity and kλ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the utility constraint for region k. 
Equations (2c) tell us how the agriculture commodity (our numeraire) should be allocated across regions. 
One unit of the numeraire good transferred to region 1 from some region k, increases region 1’s per capita 
utility by an amount 1
1
x nU , since the extra unit is shared by 1n  residents. Per capita utility in region k is 
decreased by k
k
xk nUλ , since kλ  is the shadow cost of the utility constraint and the unit shortfall is shared 
by kn  residents. Hence, equations (2c) inform us that interregional transfers of the numeraire good are 
implemented up to the point where the marginal shadow transfer benefit (of each recipient region) equates 
the marginal shadow transfer cost (of each remitter region). 
4. Regional and Interregional Policy Making 
We start our analysis of regional and interregional policy making by considering a situation in which all 
regions independently decide how to control their emissions of carbon dioxide. We call this regime 
“Regional Environmental Policy Making.” We later study two interregional policy schemes, denoted “Ideal 
Kyoto Protocol” and “Kyoto Protocol without the USA.” All regions in the globe participate in the “Ideal 
Kyoto Protocol.” This is a scenario which apparently accords well with the Kyoto Protocol envisioned by 
its founders. All regions, except the USA, participate in the other interregional policy scheme, “Kyoto 
Protocol without the USA.” This setting corresponds to a fairly optimistic view of the current situation, 
whereby all regions in the world, except the USA, will decide to participate. We do not consider other 
possible interregional policy schemes, characterized by fewer participating regions, because it does not 
seem likely that the Kyoto Protocol will survive if another country withdraws.5 It is not unreasonable to 
assume that yet another defection will trigger a chain of defections, which will eventually completely 
undermine the Protocol. 
                                                            
5 At this stage, the Kyoto Protocol can be implemented only if most of the 33 Annex I countries that remain 
decide to participate in it. A requirement for the Protocol to be enacted is that the set of participating 
countries contains countries that accounted for a share greater or equal to 55% of the total carbon dioxide 
emitted by the original 34 Annex I countries in 1990. The participation rates of the USA, Russia, Japan and 
Germany in the total emissions of Annex I countries in 1990 were 36.1%, 17.4%, 8.5% and 7.4%, 
respectively. If, in addition to the USA, Russia decides to withdraw, the Protocol will necessarily fail. If 
either Japan or Germany follows the USA’s lead, the Protocol will not necessarily fail, but its chance of 
survival will be slim. Although defection of any other Annex I country will not be as harmful in a first 
instance, it is likely that it will eventually invite others to defect, undermining the Protocol’s viability.  
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4.1. Regional Environmental Policy Making 
Suppose that there is a separate market for emission permits within each region. This will facilitate 
comparison with the subsequent arrangements. The regional government in region j – henceforth called 
“regulator j” – sets  a quota, jQ , of emission permits that can be sold. Regulator j endows each consumer 
in the region with jjj nQq ≡  emission permits. Since consumption activities do not emit carbon dioxide, 
consumers are sellers in each regional market for emission permits. Every industrial producer in region j 
must purchase at a cost 0c j ≥  an emission permit per unit of the industrial good he produces. 
The representative consumer in region j sells js  emission permits, jj qs0 ≤≤ , and earn jjsc  units 
of income. Hence, his budget constraint is 
j
j
0
j
0
j
jjjj n
pYX
scpyx
Π++
+=+ ,    
where jΠ  corresponds to the sum of industry’s and agriculture’s regional profits. This consumer chooses 
nonnegative quantities { }jjj s,y,x  to maximize ( )jjj y,xU  subject to both his budget constraint and jj qs ≤ , 
taking p , jc  and { } jj0j0j npYX Π++  as given. First, note that it is optimal for this consumer to sell jq  
pollution permits. Setting jj qs = , the budget constraint becomes 
j
j
0
j
0
j
jjjj n
pYX
qcpyx
Π++
+=+ .     (3a) 
Assuming that the consumer finds it optimal to consume strictly positive amounts of both agriculture and 
industrial commodities, the solution to his problem satisfies (3a) and the following tangency condition: 
p
U
U
j
x
j
y = .      (3b) 
Equation (3b) demonstrates that in each region the representative individual's marginal rate of substitution 
between industrial and agricultural goods must be equal to the (relative) price of the industrial good. Let 
{ } jj0j0jjjj npYXqcm Π+++≡ . We can now use equations (3) to implicitly define the demand functions 
of the representative individual in region j, ( )jj m,px  and ( )jj m,py . 
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The industrial sector in region j chooses { }jX  to maximize ( ) ( ) jjjj XXFcp +−  subject to 0Xj ≤ , 
taking p  and jc  as given. Assuming that jcp > , the industrial sector of each region maximizes profit if 
and only if 
( ) 1Fcp jXj =−− , J,...,1j =      (4a) 
that is, the realized value of the regional marginal industrial product (left side) must be equal to the regional 
marginal input cost (right side). Let jj cpr −≡  denote the price of the industrial good net of the marginal 
regulatory cost, jc . Equations (4a) enables us to implicitly define the input demand functions ( )jj rX , 
J,...,1j = . Hence, the industrial sectors’ supply functions are ( ) ( )( )jjjjj rXFrY ≡ , J,...,1j = . 
The agricultural sector in region j chooses { }jY  to maximize ( ) jjj YpE,YG +  subject to 0Yj ≤ , 
taking p  and E  as given. The agricultural sector of each region maximizes profit if and only if 
pG jY =− , J,...,1j = ,     (4b) 
that is, the regional marginal agricultural product must be equal to the regional marginal input cost. 
Equations (4b) enable us to implicitly define the input demand functions ( )E,pY j , J,...,1j = . Then, the 
agricultural sectors’ supply functions are ( ) ( )( )E,E,pYGE,pX jjj ≡ , J,...,1j = . 
 Given jr , the industrial sector in region j demands ( )jj rY  emission permits. Then, the regional 
market for permits clears if and only if 
( ) jjj QrY = .      (5a) 
Since jj cpr −≡ , we can use equation (5a) to implicitly define ( )jj Q,pc . It follows that 0Y1c jrjQ <−= , 
where j
jj
Q Qcc ∂∂≡  and j
jj
r drdYY ≡ . Since, in equilibrium, equation (5a) holds for each j, we have 
( )( ) jjjj QQ,pcpY =− , J,...,1j = .     (5b) 
We now turn our attention to the problems facing regional regulators. First, we need to compute 
regional per capita incomes and then later derive the indirect utility functions of the regional representative 
individuals. Each regulator chooses a quota level of regional permits that maximizes the utility of his 
region’s representative consumer. 
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 Given equations (5b), we can write the total profits of the industrial and agricultural sectors in 
region j, as ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )jjjjjjjj Q,pcpXQ,pcpYQ,pcp −+−−  and ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
+⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ ∑∑
==
J
1i
i
j
J
1i
i
j Q,pYpQ,pX , 
respectively. Note that equations (5b) imply that ∑
=
=
J
1j
jQE . Let ∑
=
≡
J
1j
jQQ . Adding up the profits of both 
sectors, we have ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }Q,pYpQ,pXQ,pcpXQ,pcpYQ,pcpQ,Q,p jjjjjjjjjjjj ++−+−−≡Π . 
This enables us to write regional per capita income as a function of p , jQ  and Q  as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
j
jj
j
j
j0
j
0
j
j
j
n
QQ,pcQ,Q,ppYX
Q,Q,pm
+Π++
≡ .   (6) 
 Regulator j chooses { }jQ  to maximize ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )Q,Q,pm,py,Q,Q,pm,pxUQ,Q,pV jjjjjjjjj ≡   
subject to: (6), ∑
≠
+=
J
jk
kj QQQ  and 0Q j ≥ , taking p  and kQ , jk ≠∀ , as given. Assuming an interior 
solution, the first order condition for maximization of ( )Q,Q,pV jj  is 
( ) { } ( ) 0
dQ
Q,Q,pdm
yUxU
dQ
Q,Q,pdV
j
j
j
j
m
j
y
j
m
j
x
j
j
j
=+= .    (7a) 
Since the solution to the utility maximization problem for the representative individual implies that 
1pyxy
U
U
x jm
j
m
j
mj
x
j
yj
m =+=+ ,  
the second equation in (7a) can be rewritten as 
( )
0
dQ
Q,Q,pdm
j
j
j
= .     (7b) 
Equation (7b) clearly shows that each regulator seeks to maximize regional per capita income. From 
equation (6), we obtain: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } 0ccQGYpGcYcX1Fr
n
1
dQ
Q,Q,pdm jj
Qj
j
E
j
E
j
Y
j
Q
jj
Q
j
r
j
Xj
jj
j
j
=+++++−+−= . (7c) 
Given equations (4a), (4b) and (5a), equation (7c) reduces to 
( ) ( )( ) 0Q,Q,pYGQ,pc jjEjj =+ .     (7d) 
Differentiating the first order condition (7d) with respect to jQ  yields 
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( ) ( )
0
G
GGG
cG
G
G
cGYGc
j
YY
2j
EY
j
EE
j
YYj
Q
j
EEj
YY
2j
EYj
Q
j
EE
j
E
j
EY
j
Q <
−
+≡+−≡++ .   (7e) 
The sign of the second order condition (7e) follows from strict concavity of jG  and the fact that 0c jQ < . 
Hence, the per capita income function (6) is strictly concave and the first order condition (7d) is not only 
necessary but also sufficient for an interior maximum. 
Assuming that equation (7d) holds for all j in the Nash equilibrium, we obtain: 
( ) ( )( )Q,Q,pYGQ,pc jjEjj −= , J,...,1j =  .   (8) 
Equations (8) inform us that each regulator finds it optimal to supply emission permits at the level 
in which the regional price of the permit equals the regional marginal damage caused by carbon dioxide 
emissions. Equations (8) also clearly demonstrate that in equilibrium regional supplies of emission permits 
become functions of p . Let ( )pQ j  and ( ) ( )∑
=
≡
J
1i
i pQpQ  denote the quota functions for region j and the 
globe as a whole. Now define ( ) ( ) ( )( )pQ,pQ,pmpm jjj ≡ , ( ) ( )( )pm,pypy jjj ≡ , ( ) ( )( )pQ,pcppr jjj −≡  and 
( ) ( )( )pQ,pYpY jj ≡ . Given these definitions, we may write the market clearing condition for the industrial 
good as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0pYprYYpyn
J
1j
jjj0
j
j
j =−−−∑
=
.    (9) 
The price of the industrial good, p , is determined endogenously by equation (9). 
 In this setting, the equilibrium allocation for the global economy is given by conditions (3a), (3b), 
(4a), (4b), (5b), (8) and (9).  Comparing these conditions with the Pareto efficiency conditions immediately 
reveals that regional policy making is inefficient. There are two sources of inefficiency: (1) the absence of 
interregional income transfers, since regional marginal shadow utilities of income are not necessarily 
equalized; and (2) the presence of interregional external effects associated with regional production of the 
industrial commodity, since every regulator neglects the negative effects that production of the industrial 
commodity in his region cause to every other region in the globe. 
For future reference, let jDV  denote region j’s per capita utility level realized in the global 
equilibrium allocation described above. 
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4.2 Kyoto Protocol without the USA 
Suppose that all regions in the globe, except for the USA, participate in an interregional policy scheme – 
denoted “KP-USA” for notational simplicity – in which an interregional market for carbon dioxide 
emissions coexists with an interregional transfer mechanism. Motivated by current events, we postulate that 
the USA commits to an environmental policy before the KP-USA regions commit to their own 
environmental policies. In addition, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is only able to implement 
interregional transfers after it observes the policy choices of the KP-USA regions. Hence, it seems natural 
to model the game played by the USA, the KP-USA regions and the GEF as a three-stage game. The USA 
chooses its environmental policy in the first stage of the game. The KP-USA regions observe the USA’s 
policy choice and simultaneously choose their own policies in the second stage of the game. Finally, in the 
third stage, the GEF, having already observed the policy choices of all regions, implements interregional 
income transfers across the KP-USA regions. The equilibrium concept for the game is subgame perfection.  
Before we analyze the three-stage policy game described above, let us examine how consumers 
and regional industrial and agricultural sectors behave in this regime. Let the USA be region 1 and 1m  
denote its per capita income. The representative consumer’s demand functions are ( )11 m,px  and 
( )11 m,py . This consumer’s indirect utility function is ( ) ( ) ( )( )1111111 m,py,m,pxUm,pV ≡ . 
As for the KP-USA regions, the GEF redistributes per capita incomes through its interregional 
transfer mechanism. Let kT  denote the quantity of income (in terms of the agricultural good) the GEF 
transfers to region k, if positive, or receives from region k, if negative. Interpreting km as before, let 
kkkk nTmw +≡ denote per capita income in region k after the income transfer is made. The 
representative consumer’s demand functions are ( )kk w,px  and ( )kk w,py . This consumer’s indirect utility 
function is ( ) ( ) ( )( )kkkkkkk w,py,w,pxUw,pV ≡ . 
Letting 1c  denote the price of a permit in the USA and assuming that 1cp > , the industrial sector 
in the USA maximizes profit if and only if 
( ) 1Fcp 1X1 =−−  .      (10a) 
Let 11 cpr −≡ . This industry’s input demand and supply functions are ( )11 rX  and ( )11 rY , respectively.  
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Consider now the industrial sector in region k. Let Oc  denote the price of an emission permit in 
the interregional market for permits. The problem faced by the industrial sector in region k is the same as in 
the regional policy making regime, except that now the price of a permit is Oc  rather than kc . Assuming 
that Ocp > , the industrial sector of each KP-USA region maximizes profit if and only if: 
( ) 1Fcp kXO =−− ,  J,...,2k = .    (10b) 
Let OO cpr −≡ . The industries’ input demand and supply functions are ( )Ok rX  and ( )Ok rY , J,...,2k = . 
The problem faced by the agricultural sector in each region of the globe, including the USA, is the 
same as in the regional policy making regime. Hence, equations (4b) are the profit maximization conditions 
for the regional agriculture sectors and the sectors’ input demand and supply functions are respectively 
( )E,pY j  and ( )E,pX j , J,...,1j = . 
 The permit markets – in the USA and in the aggregate KP-USA region – clear if and only if 
( ) 111 QrY = .      (11a) 
( ) ∑∑
==
=
J
2k
k
J
2k
O
k QrY .     (11b) 
Given p , equation (11a) enables us to define ( )11 Q,pc . Note that 0Y1c 1r1Q <−= . Let ∑
=
Σ ≡
J
2k
kQQ  
denote the aggregate quota of emission permits supplied in the aggregate KP-USA region.. Then, given p , 
equation (11b) can be used to define ( )ΣQ,pcO . It is easy to verify that ∑
=
<−=
J
2k
k
r
O
Q 0Y1c , where 
Σ∂∂≡ Qcc
OO
Q  and O
hh
r drdYY ≡ . 
 Regional profits in the USA and in each region k, J,...,2k = , are as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }Q,pYpQ,pXQ,pcpXQ,pcpYQ,pcpQ,Q,p 111111111111 ++−+−−≡Π , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }Q,pYpQ,pXQ,pcpXQ,pcpYQ,pcpQ,Q,p kkOkOkOk ++−+−−≡Π ΣΣΣΣ . 
 We are now ready to examine the three-stage policy game. Let us assume that the GEF's objective 
function is a weighted sum of regional per capita (indirect) utilities ( ) ∑
=
θ≡
J
2k
k
k
J2 VV,...,VF , where 0k >θ   
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for every k and 1
J
2k
k ≡θ∑
=
 . The weights are exogenously given. We postulate that they are implied by the 
equilibrium of a political bargaining game, which takes place before the regions commit to participating in 
the KP-USA. We do not, however, attempt to formalize such a game here. This is an interesting avenue for 
future work. 
Consider the third stage of the policy game. Given p , ( )J1 Q,...,Q≡Q  and  ( )J1 m,...,m≡m , the 
GEF chooses interregional income transfers { } J,...,2kkT =  to maximize ( )h
J
2h
h
h w,pV∑
=
θ  subject to 
hhhh nTmw +≡  and ∑
=
=
J
2h
h 0T . Let kkk wnW ≡  and kkk mnM ≡ , J,...,2k = . Given these definitions, 
the GEF’s problem can be alternatively expressed as the choice of { } J,...,2kkW =  to maximize 
( )kk
J
2k
k
k nW,pV∑
=
θ  subject to ∑∑
==
=
J
2k
k
J
2k
k MW . The first order conditions for maximization can be 
written as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
ν=
θ
k
kk
k
kk
kk
xk
n
nW,py,nW,pxU , J,...,2k = ,   (12a) 
∑∑
==
=
J
2k
k
J
2k
k MW ,     (12b) 
where 0>ν  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint (12b). Equations (12a) 
tell us that the GEF redistributes income across the KP-USA regions in order to equate individuals’ 
marginal utilities of income. 
 Let ∑
=
Σ ≡
J
2k
kMM denote the KP-USA’s aggregate income level. Close inspection of equations 
(12a) and (12b) reveals that we can define regional incomes as functions of the price of the industrial good 
and the KP-USA’s aggregate income level, ( )ΣM,pWk , J,...,2k = . Inserting these functions and ΣM  into 
equation (12b), we obtain 
( ) Σ
=
Σ =∑ MM,pW
J
2k
k .     (12c) 
Differentiating equation (12c) with respect to 
ΣM  yields   
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1W
J
2k
k
M =∑
=
,      (12d) 
where 
Σ∂∂≡ MWW
kk
M , for J,...,2k = . 
 The KP-USA’s aggregate income level is given by the sum of initial endowments and profits over 
all KP-USA regions. Hence, 
 ( ) ( )( )∑
=
ΣΣΣΣ Π+++=
J
2h
h0
h
0
h
O Q,Q,ppYXQQ,pcM ,    (13) 
where one should remember that ∑
=
Σ ≡
J
2h
hQQ .  
 In the second stage of the game, regulator k wishes to maximize ( )( )kkk nM,pW,pV Σ . However, 
one can easily check that ( )( )kkk nM,pW,pV Σ  is maximized if and only if regional income, ( )ΣM,pWk , 
is maximized. This implies that regulator k chooses nonnegative { }kQ  to maximize ( )ΣM,pWk  subject to 
equation (13) and ∑
=
Σ ≡
J
2h
hQQ , taking p  and every other regulator’s choice as given. Assuming that the 
solution of each regulator’s problem is interior, the first order conditions that characterize the Nash 
equilibrium in the second stage of the game are 
0GcW
J
2h
h
E
Ok
M =⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+∑
=
, J,...,2k = .    (14a) 
Given equation (12d), we obtain the following result when we add up the J-1 equations (14a): 
0GcWGc
J
2h
h
E
O
J
2k
k
M
J
2h
h
E
O =⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+ ∑∑∑
===
, 
or 
( ) ( )( )∑
=
Σ −=
J
2h
hh
E
O Q,Q,pYGQ,pc .     (14b) 
 Equation (14b) is the equilibrium condition that determines the KP-USA’s aggregate quota level. 
It states that all regulators within the aggregate KP-USA region agree on a emission permit price equal to 
the sum of the marginal damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions to all KP-USA regions. As each 
regulator’s maximization problem makes it clear, the transfers implemented by the GEF induce each 
regulator to choose a quota level which maximizes the KP-USA aggregate income level. Hence, each 
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regulator has a strong incentive to internalize the externalities that production of the industrial good in his 
region causes to all other KP-USA regions. 
Equation (14b) permits us to define the KP-USA’s aggregate quota as a function of the quota of 
emission permits supplied by the USA and the price of the industrial good, namely, ( )1Q,pQΣ . Inserting 
this function into equation (14b), we have  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑
=
ΣΣΣ ++−=
J
2k
1111
kk
E1
O QQQ,QQQ,pYGQQ,pc .   (15) 
Differentiating equation (15) with respect to 1Q  yields 
( ) ( )
0
c
G
GGG
c
GYG
dQ
dQ
o
Q
J
2k
k
YY
2k
YE
k
EE
k
YY
o
Q
J
2k
k
EE
k
E
k
YE
1
<
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
−≡
+
−=
∑∑
==
Σ
.   (16) 
Equation (16) demonstrates that an expansion in the USA’s quota leads to a reduction in the KP-USA’s 
aggregate quota. 
 In the first stage of the game, the regulator in the USA chooses nonnegative { }1Q  to maximize 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1111111010111 QQ,pcQQQ,Q,ppYXQ,pM ++Π++≡ Σ .   (17) 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition can be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )111111E
1
1
1
1 Q,pQQ,Q,pQQ,pYG
dQ
Q,pdQ
1Q,pc ΣΣ
Σ
++⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+−= ,  (18) 
where 1dQdQ
Σ  is given by equation (16). Equation (18) states that the USA’s regulator chooses a quota 
level such that the USA’s permit price equals the “perceived” marginal damage caused by carbon dioxide 
emissions in the USA. The perceived marginal damage depends on how the KP-USA’s aggregate quota 
responds to an expansion in the USA’s quota. Since the KP-USA’s aggregate quota falls in response to an 
expansion in the USA’s quota, the perceived marginal damage in the USA is lower than 1EG . 
Equation (18) allows us to implicitly define the USA’s optimal quota level as a function of the 
price of the industrial good, ( )pQ1 . Inserting this function into equation (17) yields 
( ) ( )( ) 1111 npQ,pMpm ≡ . Inserting ( )pQ1  into equation (15) implies ( ) ( )( )pQ,pQpQ 1ΣΣ ≡ . Plugging 
( )pQ1  and ( )pQΣ  into equation (13) yields ( )pM Σ  and thus ( ) ( )( ) kkk npM,pWpw Σ≡ . Let 
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( ) ( )( )pm,pypy 111 ≡ , ( ) ( )( )pw,pypy kkk ≡ , ( ) ( )( )pQ,pcppr 111 −≡ , ( ) ( )( )pQ,pcppr 1OO −≡ , 
( ) ( )( )pQ,pYpY 11 ≡ , ( ) ( )( )pQ,pYpY kk ≡  and ( ) ( ) ( )pQpQpQ 1 Σ+≡ . Then, the price of the industrial 
good is determined by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ ∑
== =
+++=
J
2k
Ok11
J
1j
J
1j
j0
j
j
j prYprYpYYpyn .   (19) 
The equilibrium allocation of resources for the global economy in this setting is characterized by 
equations (3b), (4b), (10a), (10b), (11a), (11b), (12a), (12b), (13), (14a), (14b), (17), (18), (19) and the 
budget constraints, 111 mpyx =+ and kkk wpyx =+ , k = 2,...,J. Combining equations (4b), (10b) and 
(14b) yields 
∑
=
+=
J
2h
k
Ek
X
k
Y GF
1G . J,...,2k = .    (20a) 
Combining equations (4b), (10a) and (18), we obtain 
 1E
1
1
X
1
Y GdQ
dQ1
F
1G ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
++=
Σ
.     (20b) 
Now consider the Pareto efficiency conditions (1f) for j = 2,…,J. Equations (20a) differ from their 
Pareto efficiency counterparts only in that they do not include the marginal damages caused to the USA. 
Equation (20b) differs from its Pareto efficiency counterpart in that it is perceived marginal damage does 
not correspond to the global marginal damage. It is also worth noting that the equilibrium conditions that 
tell us how interregional transfers are made do not correspond to their Pareto efficiency counterparts 
because the equilibrium conditions do not include transfers from or to the USA while Pareto efficiency 
requires interregional transfers be made across all regions in the globe. 
For future reference, let 1jV  be region j’s per capita utility level realized in the global equilibrium 
allocation described in this section. 
4.3. Ideal Kyoto Protocol 
Suppose now that all regions in the globe, including the USA, participate in the Kyoto Protocol (KP). 
Regulators and the GEF play a two-stage game, whereby regulators commit to their environmental policies 
before the GEF implements interregional transfers. The equilibrium concept for the two-stage game is 
again subgame perfection. 
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 Let c  denote the global price of an emission permit. Assuming that cp > , each region’s industrial 
sector maximizes profit if and only if 
( ) 1Fcp jX =−− , J,...,1j = .     (21) 
Let cpr −≡ . Equations (21) enable us to define ( )rX j , J,...,1j = . Hence, ( ) ( )( )rXFrY jjj ≡ , J,...,1j = . 
As before, equations (4b) yield the regional agricultural sectors’ input functions ( )Q,pY j , J,...,1j =  . Thus, 
( ) ( )( )Q,Q,pYGQ,pX jjj ≡ , J,...,1j = . 
 The global market for emission permits clears if and only if 
( ) QrY
J
1j
j =∑
=
.      (22) 
Equation (22) permits us to define ( )Q,pc . It is easy to verify that ∑
=
<−=
J
1j
j
rQ 0Y1c . We can now define 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }Q,pYpQ,pXQ,pcpXQ,pcpYQ,pcpQ,p jjjjj ++−+−−≡Π , the total profit in region j.. 
 Let jjjj nTmw +≡  be per capita income in region j. The redistribution constraint for the 
interregional transfers is now ∑
=
=
J
1j
j 0T . The demand functions for the representative consumer in region j 
are ( )jj w,px  and ( )jj w,py . His indirect utility function is ( ) ( ) ( )( )jjjjjjj w,py,w,pxUw,pV ≡ . 
 Taking p , ( )J1 Q,...,Q≡Q  and ( )J1 m,...,m≡m  as given, the GEF chooses { } J,...,1jjW =  to 
maximize ( )jjj
J
1j
j nW,pV∑
=
θ  subject to: 
MMW
J
1j
j
J
1j
j ≡=∑∑
==
,     (23a) 
where 0j >θ  for all j and 1
J
1j
j ≡θ∑
=
. Besides equation (23a), the first order conditions for maximization 
can be written as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
η=
θ
j
jj
j
jj
jj
xj
n
nW,py,nW,pxU
, J,...,1j = ,  (23b) 
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where 0>η  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (23a). Equations (23b) demonstrate 
that the GEF implements transfers in order to equalize individual marginal utilities of income across all 
regions in the globe. These conditions, therefore, satisfy the Pareto efficiency requirement that the 
individual marginal shadow utilities of income be equalized across all regions of the globe. Note that 
equations (23b) are identical to equations (2c) provided that 1kk θθ=λ , J,...,2k = . 
 Equations (23) enable us to define ( )M,pW j , J,...,1j = . Plugging these functions into equation 
(23a) yields 
( ) MM,pW
J
1j
j =∑
=
.     (23c) 
Differentiating equation (23c) with respect to M , we obtain 
1W
J
1j
j
M =∑
=
,      (24c) 
where MWW jjM ∂∂≡ , J,...,1j = . 
 The global income level, M , is the sum of all regions’ initial endowments and profits. Then, 
( ) ( )( )∑
=
Π+++=
J
1j
j0
j
0
j Q,ppYXQQ,pcM .    (25) 
 In the first stage of the game, regulator j chooses nonnegative { }jQ  to maximize ( )M,pW j  
subject to equation (25), taking p  and the choice of every other regulator as given. Assuming that the 
solution to each regulator’s problem is interior, the first order conditions that characterize the Nash 
equilibrium in the first stage of the game are 
0GcW
J
1i
i
E
j
M =⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+∑
=
, J,...,1j = .    (26a) 
Given equation (24c), we obtain the following result when we add up equations (26a) over all j: 
0GcWGc
J
1i
i
E
J
1j
j
M
J
1i
i
E =⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+ ∑∑∑
===
,  
or 
 ( ) ( )( )Q,Q,pYGQ,pc i
J
1i
i
E∑
=
−= .     (26b) 
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 Equation (26b) determines the equilibrium global quota level. It shows that each regulator agrees 
on a price of permits equal to the global marginal damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions. The 
interregional transfers implemented by the GEF induces each regulator to choose a regional quota level that 
maximizes global income. Hence, each regulator finds it desirable to acknowledge the negative effects 
brought about by  production of the industrial good in his region. 
 Equation (26b) enables us to define the global quota of emission permits as a function of the price 
of the industrial good, ( )pQ . Inserting this function into equation (25), we obtain ( )pM . Hence, we can 
define ( ) ( )( ) jjj npM,pWpw ≡  and ( ) ( )( )pw,pypy jjj ≡ . Let ( ) ( )( )pQ,pcppr j −≡  and ( ) ( )( )prYpY jjj ≡ . 
Let also ( ) ( )( )pQ,pYpY jj ≡ . Hence, the price of the industrial good is determined by the following market 
clearing condition: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑
= =
++=
J
1j
J
1j
jj0
j
j
j pYpYYpyn .    (27)   
 The global equilibrium allocation of resources in this setting is characterized by equations (3b), 
(4b), (21), (22), (23a), (23b), (25), (26a), (26b), (27) and the budget constraints, jjj wpyx =+ , J,...,1j = . 
Equations (3b) and (4b) imply that the equilibrium allocation satisfies the Pareto efficiency conditions (1d) 
and (1e), respectively. Furthermore, equations (4b), (21) and (26b) together yield the Pareto efficiency 
conditions (1f). Since we have already established that the equilibrium allocation satisfies the Pareto 
efficiency conditions underlying interregional transfers, we can state this paper’s main result as follows: 
 
Theorem 1: Provided that all regions in the globe participate in the Kyoto Protocol and 0Q j >  for all j in 
the subgame perfect equilibrium for the policy game played by the regional regulators and the GEF, the 
implied equilibrium allocation of resources for the global economy is Pareto efficient. 
 
 Theorem 1 is extremely important in light of the USA’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto 
Protocol and the current set of events, in which some countries, such as Russia and Japan, are still unsure 
whether or not they should ratify the Protocol. The efficiency properties of the Ideal Kyoto Protocol 
scheme, clearly described in Theorem 1, imply that there is potential for each region in the globe to 
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improve its welfare level relative to what it obtains in the status quo. To see this formally, let *JV  denote 
region j’s welfare level in the equilibrium described in this section. Because the equilibrium allocation 
implied by the Ideal Kyoto Protocol scheme is Pareto efficient and the equilibrium allocations implied by 
regional policy making and the KP-USA scheme are inefficient, we have 
∑∑
==
>
J
1j
0j
j
J
1j
*j
j VnVn ,     (28a) 
 ∑∑
==
>
J
1j
1j
j
J
1j
*j
j VnVn .     (28b) 
Inequality (28a) tell us that the Ideal Kyoto Protocol scheme can satisfy all regions’ participation 
constraints if the status quo is characterized by regional policy making – i.e., if the Kyoto Protocol fails. 
Similarly, inequality (28b) states that all regions’ participation constraints can also be satisfied by the Ideal 
Kyoto Protocol scheme if the status quo is characterized by a setting in which the USA is the only region 
that does not participate in the Kyoto Protocol. An interesting implication of inequality (28) is that there is 
scope for bribing the USA to reverse its withdraw decision. The bribe would have to satisfy 
11*1 VV ≥       (29a) 
while, at the same time, not violating 
1k*k VV ≥ , J,...,2k = .    (29b) 
Now, notice that inequality (28b) implies that inequality (29a) as well as the set of J-1 inequalities (29b) 
can all be satisfied slack. Not only would the USA be better off by reversing its withdraw decision, but also 
every other region in the globe would benefit from conceding to terms – i.e., the bribe – that would 
persuade the USA to reverse its decision! 
 Our global economy does not explicitly distinguish developed from developing regions. How does 
our analysis then capture the Kyoto Protocol’s intention of transferring resources from developed to 
developing regions? Since the levels of per capita income are higher in developed regions than in 
developing regions, the marginal utilities of income are lower in developed regions. Given the exogenous 
weights assigned to regional welfare levels, the redistributive transfer mechanism operated by the GEF 
transfers resources from regions whose weighted marginal utilities of income are low to regions whose 
weighted marginal utilities of income are high. If, for example, the weights are equal across all regions, the 
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transfer mechanism will necessarily transfer resources from developed to developing regions. Indeed, it can 
be shown that there is a large number of weight allocations that would imply resource transfers from 
developed to developing regions without violating the participation constrains (29a) and (29b). 
 It must also be stressed that our efficiency result depends crucially on the timing of the policy 
game played by regional regulators and the GEF.6 It is, for example, straightforward to show that if the 
timing of the game were changed so that the GEF “moved” first and the regional regulators “moved” last, 
the implied subgame perfect equilibrium would not feature condition (26b) because the regulators would 
not attempt to maximize global income. Since they would essentially treat the GEF transfers as lump-sum 
transfers, their decisions would not depend on such transfers. Each regulator would choose a policy that 
maximizes regional income, neglecting therefore the negative externalities caused by regional emissions. 
 Fortunately, our assumption about the timing of the policy game appears to be consistent with 
reality. The GEF cannot possibly be a Stackelberg leader. Because it is incapable of punishing nations for 
not complying with environmental standards, it lacks political and economical powers to design and 
enforce interregional schemes to control emissions of carbon dioxide. Not surprisingly, design and 
enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol are responsibilities of the participating nations. As we mentioned in the 
introduction, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, which represents the supreme body of the Convention, delegated authority to the GEF to operate 
the financial mechanism. Therefore, it appears quite reasonable to postulate that the GEF is a common 
Stackelberg follower in the policy game played with regional regulators. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that there is a combination of emissions trading and transfer mechanisms that 
yields an efficient allocation of resources for a global economy. The transfer mechanism should be 
redistributive and operated after the regional governments make their policy commitments regarding how 
to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide. Furthermore, there should be global participation in both 
mechanisms. An interregional scheme featuring global participation and the efficient mix of mechanisms 
and timing of operations described above is what an ideal Kyoto Protocol should look like. 
                                                            
6 Our efficiency result, however, does not depend on our game being a quantity leadership game rather than 
a price leadership game. Changing the strategy space would not alter the incentives of regulators of 
maximizing global income in the first stage of the game.  
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